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abstract
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] is charged with
inspectin g both individual public company audits as well as audit firm quality
control systems. PCAOB inspection reports include information on deficiencies

in

in dividual audits as well as quality control system defects. However, portions of the

inspection reports describing any quality control system defects are not made
public unless the firm does not correct those deficiencies withm one year. 1 classify
each firm as Type 1, Type 2 or Type 3. Type 1 firms are those whose quality control
system defects were uncorrected and therefore disclosed after the allotted year,
Type 2 firms are

those that had control system defects and corrected those defects

within the year. Type 3 firms never had quality control system defects. As the
quality control system defects for Type 2 firms are not made public, subtle wording
differences in Part B of PCAOB inspection reports allow a reader to distinguish
between Type 2 and Type 3 firms as inspection reports for Type 3 firms explicitly
state that the inspection team identified no quality control system defects. This
study explores the characteristics of audit firms that have quality control system
defects and the determinants of whether those firms resolve their quality control
system defects within the allotted year. I examine these questions based on data
hand-collected from publicly available PCAOB inspection reports. I find that
variables indicative of firm size, particularly number of partners, may be positively

associated with the tendency to correct quality control system defects in a timely
manner. Also, I find that firms with more issuer clients scaled by proxies for firm
size are less likely to correct their quality control system defects. Similarly, I find
that firms with only one partner may be less likely to correct their quality control
system defects. Finally, my results show that firms who provide written responses
to PCAOB inspection reports are more likely to fi x their quality control system
defects in the allotted year. These findings are important because there has been
little research on the inspection reports of triennially-inspected firms (audit firms
defects.
with 100 or fewer issuer clients), particularly on the quality control system
Because PCAOB inspection reports are more opaque than the Peer Review reports
they replaced, it is important for users to be aware of potential relationships
between firm characteristics and whether or not that firm corrects its quality
control system defects. Further, it is important that the PCAOB understand w
inspections are likely to prompt improvements in quality.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)is charged with
inspecting both individual public company audits as well as audit firm quality
controls systems. PCAOB inspection reports include information on deficiencies in
individual audits as well as quality control system defects. However, portions of the
inspection reports describing any quality control system defects are not made
public unless the firm does not resolve those deficiencies within one year. This
study explores the characteristics of audit firms that have quality control system
defects and the determinants of whether those firms resolve their quality control
system defects within the allotted year. I determine the existence of quality control
system defects according to subtle wording differences in PCAOB inspection reports.
Part B of the inspection reports for firms who never had quality control system
defects explicitly states that the inspection team found no quality control system
defects. Part B in the inspection reports for firms that had quality control system
defects and corrected them within the year state that any quality control system
defects will be disclosed a year from the inspection date if they remain uncorrected.
The quality control system defects are disclosed in Part B of the inspection reports
for firms who failed to correct their quality control system defects in the allotted
year. 1 examine these questions based on data hand-collected from publicly
available Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB]inspection reports.
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Prior research has explored various aspects of the PCAOB's inspection
regime. Some recent studies examine the economic effects of PCAOB inspections.
For example, Lennox and Pittman (2010)explore the usefulness of inspection
reports to audit market participants as well as the impact of the PCAOB inspection
reports on the usefulness of reports produced under the extant peer review system.
Other studies consider the attitude of various constituencies of the inspection
regime towards the quality of the inspection process. For example, Daugherty and
Tervo (2010),survey the leadership of inspected firms regarding their perceptions
of PCAOB inspection team performance and the inspection process.

Further research explores the actual contents of inspection reports.
Hermanson et al.(2007) find that among triennially inspected firmsL inspection
reports are more likely to report auditing deficiencies for firms that are smaller and
have larger numbers of issuer clients. I add to the literature on the contents of
inspection reports of these triennially inspected firms by examining the relationship
between firm demographics and the likelihood that they will resolve quality control
System defects in a timely manner. Thus far, little research has focused on quality
control system defects included in the inspection reports. This is likely true because
the PCAOB was created in 2002 and firms with quality control system defects are
given a year to resolve those deficiencies before information about them is disclosed
publicly. Therefore, because many firms resolve their quality control system defects
within the time allowed,there has until recently been little data available about

1 Auditing firms with fewer than 100 issuer clients are inspected triennially, while firms with 100 or
more issuer clients are inspected annually.
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those deficiencies. However,over the last several years,the PCAOB has made public
the quality control system defects section of a number of firms' inspections reports.
making it possible to explore factors that affect the likelihood that a firm will
remedy those deficiencies.

1 examine PCAOB inspection reports for a sample of 188 firms,94 of which
corrected their quality control system defects and 94 that did not correct their
deficiencies within the allotted year. I hand collect data from each inspection report
including firm characteristics, audit deficiencies, and quality control system defects.
1 then analyze this data to determine whether any firm characteristics may be
determinants of a firm's tendency to fix its quality control system defects.

My findings indicate that larger firms in terms of number of offices, number
of partners,and number of professional staff may be more likely to correct quality
control system defects. I also find that firms who have more issuer clients scaled by
firm size, and therefore may face a higher resource strain, are less likely to correct
their quality control system defects. Similarly, my findings show some evidence that
firms with only one partner are also less likely to correct their quality control
system defects. Finally, my results also indicate that firms who provide written
responses to PCAOB inspection reports may be more likely to correct their quality
control system defects within the allotted year.

In addition, I find that firms that fail to correct their quality control system
defects in a timely manner have a greater total number of audit deficiencies than
those firms that do correct their deficiencies. I also classify each of the disclosed

quality control system defects according to the taxonomy of the Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards plus one additional category for system wide deficiencies.

I
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11. CREATION OF THE PCAOB

Until the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted,the accounting profession was
self-regulated, relying primarily on private organizations including the Peer Review
Program for supervision and guidance. While the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) had statutory authority to regulate financial reporting and
financial statement auditing, both the Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB)
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA] played key roles
in determining the authoritative criteria to be followed in the accounting profession.
The FASB is a private-sector organization responsible for establishing standards of
financial accounting that governs financial reporting for nongovernmental entities.
These standards are recognized as authoritative by the SEC. The AICPA is a national
professional organization that develops standards for services provided by CPAs.
According to Kinney(2005), Congress and the SEC merely provided oversight for
private regulation in the profession and applied the "fire alarm” approach regarding
reporting regulation. According to the "fire alarm" approach, a regulator does not
take action until constituents- in this case the users of financial statements-express
complaints. The regulatory changes that occurred over the next twenty years

were

primarily "fire alarm" responses to changing economic and legal conditions,
criticisms of the Peer Review Program,and several highly publicized audit failures.
These responses emphasized increased self-regulation until the passage of the
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and with it, the creation of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB].

Three factors remained constant in the twenty-five years leading to the
creation of the PCAOB and therefore re-regulation of the accounting profession.
First, user perceptions of relevance, due professional care, and trustworthiness
remained the core determinants of value of audited financial statements. Next,
there was a consistent expectations gap with users of financial statements. It is
often difficult for financial statement users to separate a business failure from an
audit failure, particularly during an economic downturn. Finally, the organization of
audit firms was constant. Virtually all large audit firms organized as limited liability
partnerships, and as such, auditors assume greater personal responsibility although
they are generally viewed as performing a "public service". These factors combined
with several events in the two decades preceding 2002 led Congress to re-regulate
the accounting profession.

Throughout the 1980's,the accounting profession experienced an increase
in competition as the ban on advertising, solicitation, and competitive bidding was
lifted. An expansion of services into the consulting function also increased audit
firm size. This increased firm size coupled with the increased price competition
negatively affected audit quality. The 1990's brought about a combination of
conditions that led to a substantial increase in stock based compensation. As such,
the pressure for management to manipulate stock prices by pennies in order to
meet performance goals increased. At the time, these differences were allowed
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because they were deemed "immaterial" but they led to the adoption of SAS No.89
and and SAB No.99, which increased self-regulation by improving the effectiveness
of audit committees. Despite these efforts,there was still a call for increased
regulation in the profession that would eventually be answered by the creation of
the PCAOB (Kinney 2005).

Another factor leading to the passage ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act was investor
concern over large corporations (or clients) manipulating revenues and possible
corresponding audit failures. The most highly publicized case of this is the Enron
audit failure. In October of 2001,Enron announced that it suffered over a $600
million third quarter net loss and was reducing shareholder equity by $1.2 billion.
The following day,the SEC opened an investigation and requested information from
Enron's management. Shortly after, the engagement team from Enron's auditor,
Arthur Andersen, began destroying Enron-related documents. Andersen,the lead
partner from the audit team,as well as four former Enron executives faced criminal
charges in what was the largest bankruptcy in Unites States history at the time.
Following Enron,it became clear that the problem of earnings management was not
isolated as investigations began into several other companies (Brickey 2003). The
public audit failure of Enron and subsequent investigations were yet another

reason

for the call to increase regulation in the accounting profession.
Finally, there were also several criticisms of the Peer Review Program that
contributed to the re-regulation of the accounting profession in 2002. The Peer
Review Program,started by the AICPA in 1977, was a response to public audit
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failures throughout the 1970's. Firms who audited SEC registrants were
encouraged to join the SEC Practice Section, and as such were subject to triennial
peer review. Peer reviews typically involved the reviewer(s) familiarizing
themselves with the company's control environment and performing a walkthrough
of procedures for a sample of engagements. The reviewer(s) then issued an overall
opinion with supporting comments(Anatharaman 2012]. Firms could be reviewed
by a team appointed by the AICPA,a private CPA firm or an individual CPA firm
[Hilary 2005].

Common criticisms of the Peer Review Program are that it lacked
independence and credibility. The AICPA attempted to address the issue of
independence by prohibiting reciprocal reviews. This theoretically prevented firms
from entering into arrangements where clean opinions were issued in return for
clean opinions. In a study by Hillary and Lennox[2005]examining the credibility of
self-regulation, no cases of reciprocal review were found in the sample, which
suggests that this rule was being enforced. While the remaining evidence in their
study led them to conclude that peer reviews did provide credible information
about audit quality, they also noted that modified or adverse opinions were rarely
issued, which could be an indication that serious deficiencies were overlooked in
some cases. Similarly, they found that reviewers were not as likely to disclose audit
deficiencies for firms with which they did not compete [Hilary and Lennox 2005].
The potential lack of credibility and independence was yet another reason for the
need for further regulation in the profession.

R

In 2002,as a response to these growing complaints, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a drastic change in that it led away
from the long accepted practice of self-regulation and established an outside
regulatory authority for the accounting profession,the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, or PCAOB.

Section 101 of the act established the PCAOB as a private, nonprofit
organization to oversee the audits of public companies. Public accounting firms
with SEC issuer clients are required to register with the PCAOB.The Sarbanes Oxley
Act also tasks the PCAOB with establishing auditing, review,independence, ethics
and quality controls standards for its registered firms. In addition, the PCAOB is
required to inspect these firms to ensure that they are complying with the PCAOB's
standards. The PCAOB inspects registered firms with more than 100 issuer clients
on an annual basis and inspects firms with 100 or fewer issuer clients triennially.
Those inspections include reviews of specific audit engagements as well as the
firms' quality control systems.

When an inspection is completed,the PCAOB compiles a report on the results
of the inspection. An example of one of these inspection reports can be found in the
Appendix of this manuscript. Each report summarizes the PCAOB's inspection
process and provides demographic data regarding the firm, including its location,
number of offices, number of partners and professional staff, number of issuer
clients and organizational structure. The reports also describe the inspection team's
findings. Specifically, each report details any audit engagement deficiencies or

q

quality control system defects identified by the inspection team. The inspection
reports are made available to the public and firms are given the opportunity to
provide written responses to these inspection reports. However,information about
any defects in the firms' quality control system and related discussion in firm
responses are redacted from the public report unless the firm does not resolve
those defects within one year of the report date.
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III. PRIOR RESEARCH

A significant amount of research has examined various aspects of the PCAOB
inspection reports and the findings documented within them, particularly related to
those firms that are inspected on an annual basis. The current study focuses on the
inspection reports of firms with 100 or fewer issuer clients and,in part,follows
Hermanson Houston and Rice (2007).

Hermanson et al.(2007) examine the PCAOB inspection reports of 316
trienially-inspected CPA firms covering the period from the PCAOB's inception
through June 2006. Their objective was to determine whether or not a relationship
exists between firm characteristics and the existence of certain audit engagement
deficiencies. The firm characteristics they examined are almost all found on the
public portion of PCAOB inspection reports and include: the nature of written
responses, presence of audit and quality control system defects, inspection date,
number of issuer clients, duration of inspection, report lag, number of offices,
number of partners, number of staff, and total professionals.

After documenting that 60 percent of the inspected firms have audit
deficiencies, Hermanson,et al.(2007) explore several possible associations between
certain firm characteristics and the likelihood of audit deficiencies. They classify
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each audit deficiency in two ways as shown in Table 1. Their research indicates
that firms with audit deficiencies tend to be smaller in that they have fewer staff
partners, and total professionals. Despite being smaller in size, firms with audit
deficiencies have a larger number of issuer clients and are growing more rapidly
than firms without deficiencies. They also find differences relating to the inspection
year. Specifically, they show that firms inspected in 2004 were more likely to have
audit deficiencies than those firms inspected in 2005.

There is also a growing amount of literature that explores whether PCAOB
inspection reports reflect audit quality. For example, Lennox and Pittman [2010)
reported findings that suggest that many audit clients do not view the PCAOB
reporting model as being informative about audit quality. A more recent study by
Gramling, Krishnan and Zhang[2011)adds to the literature on triennially inspected
firms by investigating a different side of the PCAOB inspection reports. Their study
explores whether or not a firm with identified audit deficiencies is likely to change
its going-concern reporting behavior for its financially distressed clients. Based on
an analysis of PCAOB inspection reports from 2004 to 2006,they find that firms
with deficiencies were more likely to issue going-concern opinions after their
PCAOB inspection than prior to their inspection.

After reading several reports on the PCAOB inspection process and
examining the findings of many researchers on this topic, it was unclear what
relationship, if any, the quality control system defects identified in the inspection
reports had to identified audit deficiencies,firm characteristics, or perception of

17.

Table 1: Audit deficiency classification used by Hermanson et al.(2007)
1. According to the general nature of the

2. According to the specific nature
ofthe deficiency:

deficiency:

Substantive Tests

Failure to Perform and Document
Various Procedures or Analyses

Audit Report

Failure to Adequately/Properly
Evaluate (related to various issues)

Tests of Controls

Failure to Test(related to various
issues)

Planning

Failure to Identiiy, or Address
Appropriately, GAAP Departures

General Documentation

Inappropriate Reliance on Others'
Work (other external or internal
auditors

Documentation Deficiencies

Other

1

audit quality. My research follows a similar process and examines many of the same
firm and inspection characteristics as Hermanson et al.[2007). However,rather
than focusing on the relationship between these characteristics and the existence of
audit deficiencies, my research focuses on exploring any relationships between
these characteristics and whether or not a firm will correct its quality control
system defects within the allotted year.

('
i

I

I
1
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IV. THEORY/HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Several prior studies suggest that larger audit firms produce higher audit
quality [e.g., DeAngelo 1981; Dye 1993; Lennox 1999; Geiger and Rama 2006).
There are a number of arguments that predict this relationship. First, DeAngelo
[1981] argues that larger firms are more independent because no one client is
essential to their business. Further, because they have many clients and partners,
larger firms have more to lose and are therefore more concerned ^vith maintaining
their reputation than smaller firms. Similarly, Dye[1993)argues that larger
auditors have deeper pockets. Therefore,larger firms have more wealth to protect
and more incentive to maintain higher audit quality. In addition,studies have also
shown that relative to other firms, the Big 4 carry a 20% higher audit fee. This
higher fee could be due to either a greater number of hours worked or a higher
billing rate, reflective of greater auditor expertise. Either case would imply higher
audit quality (Francis 2004).

As prior studies show a relationship between larger firms and higher audit
quality, it is reasonable to predict that larger firms will be more likely to correct any
identified quality control system defects within the allotted year. Further, this
potential relationship is intuitive in that larger firms are more likely than smaller
firms to have the necessary resources to correct quality control system defects. That
is, the ability to correct some of the quality control system defects described in
iq

PCAOB inspection reports is directly related to firm size. For example,one common
quality control system defect concerns the firm's engagement quality review
process. Under PCAOB auditing standards, each engagement should be reviewed by
a partner, who is otherwise independent of the engagement Smaller firms with
fewer partners would necessarily have fewer resources with which to remedy
quality control system defects related to this process simply because they are less
likely to have other partners available to perform this task. For these reasons, I
make the following prediction:

HYPOTHESIS 1: Larger firms are more likely than smaller firms to correct quality
control system defects identified in PCAOB inspection reports within the allotted
year.

In general, the number of issuer clients may be a proxy for the size of an
audit firm. However,if firm resources remain constant while the number ofissuer
clients increases, that increase in clients could result in strained resources that
could impact audit quality as well as the firm's ability to maintain an adequate
system of quality control. For example, Hermanson, Houston and Rice(2007)find
that firms with audit engagement deficiencies tend to have more issuer clients. In
addition to direct effects on engagement quality and the effectiveness of the firm's
quality control system, resource strain is also likely to impact the firm's ability and
the resources available to respond to quality control system defects identified by
PCAOB inspectors. Therefore, 1 predict the following:

^fi

HYPOTHESIS 2: Firms with more issuer clients scaled by firm size are less likely to
correct quality control system defects identified in PCOAB inspection reports within
the allotted year.

1 also specifically examine whether the number of partners in a firm effects
whether or not the firm corrects its quality control system defects within a year. It
is reasonable to believe that in firms with only one partner,there will be less
accountability because the sole partner answers to no one else. Also,similar to
above,firms with only one partner may not have the resources available to correct
quality control system defects such as problems with concurring partner review.
Therefore, I believe that firms with only one partner will be less likely to correct
their deficiencies.

hypothesis 3: Firms with only one partner are less likely to correct their quality
control defects within the allotted year than are firms with more than one partner.

Finally, the PCAOB allows inspected audit firms to submit a response letter
for inclusion in the inspection report. Hermanson, Houston and Rice (2007]find
that many firms submit such response letters and are more likely to do so when the
PCAOB identifies audit engagement deficiencies. While those authors do not further
explore the implications of those response letters,they do encourage future
research on the matter. Therefore, I also explore the relationship between a firm's
tendency to provide a written response for inclusion in the PCAOB's inspection
report and the firm's tendency to correct its quality control system defects within
the allotted year. Without taking into account the tone of the response, one could
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logically expect that firms that provide written responses to PCAOB inspection
reports are more responsive to these reports in general. Therefore,it would be
reasonable to also predict that these firms will be more likely to specifically respond
to and correct the identified quality control system defects than those firms that did
not provide a written response. Therefore, I make the following prediction:

HYPOTHESIS 4: Among firms with identified quality control system defects, firms
that provide a written response to PCAOB inspection reports are more likely to
correct their quality control system defects within the allotted year.

IB

V. METHODOLOGY

To begin my research process, I examined all of the PCAOB inspection
reports made available on the Board's public website with inspection dates through
March 2009. 1 classified each report as Type 1,Type 2,or Tj^^e 3 as shown in Table
2.

Table 2: Criteria for determining firm type
TYPE

CRITERIA

1

These inspection reports had quality control system defects
that were not corrected within the allotted year and
therefore were made public by the PCAOB.
These inspection reports had quality control system defects
that were corrected within the allotted year and therefore
were not made public by the PCAOB.
These inspection reports identified no quality control
system defects and were not considered for the purpose of
this thesis.

2

3

1 classified each report according to the language in the report. Type 1 firms
are easily identified because quality control system defects are made public in part
B of the inspection report as shown in the sample report in the Appendix. However,
distinguishing between Type 2 and Type 3 reports requires reading Part B of each
report for subtle differences in the wording of the explanation of the PCAOB's
inspection of each firm's quality control system. As illustrated in the excerpts
below, the inspection reports are ambiguous about the potential presence of quality
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control system defects when those deficiencies do in fact exist. However, when no
such defects have been identified, the inspection report explicitly states that the
inspection team did not identify any defects in the quality control system.

Type 2:
In addition to evaluating the quality ofthe audit work performed on specific audits,
the inspection included review ofcertain ofthe Firm's practices, policies and
procedures related to audit quality. This review addressed practices, policies and
procedures concerning audit performance, training, compliance with independence
standards, client acceptance and retention, and the establishment ofpolicies and
procedures. As described above,any defects in, or criticisms of, the Firm's quality
control system are discussed in the nonpublic portion ofthis report and will
remain nonpublic unless the Firm fails to address them to the Board's
satisfaction within 12 months ofthe date ofthis report"

Type 3:

"In addition to evaluating the quality ofthe audit work performed on specific audits,
the inspection included review ofcertain ofthe Firm's practices, policies and
procedures related to audit quality. This review addressed practices, policies and
procedures concerning audit performance, training, compliance with independence
standards, client acceptance and retention, and the establishment ofpolicies and
procedures. The inspection team did not identify anything that it considered to be
a quality control defect that warrants discussion in a Board inspection report"

After classifying each inspection report as a Type 1,Type 2, or Type 3 report,
I hand-collected certain data from all of the Type 1 and Type 2 inspection reports.
Initially, 1 recorded the report date and inspection date, noting the month and year
that the inspection began as some inspections lasted several weeks. Excluding
annually inspected firms, my sample included 94 Type 1 reports with quality
control system defects. Next, 1 chose a matched sample of94 Type 2 reports based
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on the year of inspection. After excluding any annually inspected firms, 1 sorted the
Type 2 reports by the year of the inspection date and assigned a random number to
each report within each year. Next, I sorted the reports within each year based on
the random number and,starting from the beginning of the list, selected a number
of Type 2 reports such that the number of Type 2 reports equaled the number of
Type 1 reports in that year.

For each Type 1 report and for each Type 2 report included in the matched
sample, I hand-collected additional data from the inspection reports including firm
location, number of offices, ownership structure, number of partners, number of
professional staff, number of issuer audit clients,and whether or not the firm
provided a written response to the inspection report For the purposes of my
research, 1 considered number of offices, number of partners, and number of total
professional staff as a proxy for firm size. This is intuitive, as larger firms would
most likely have more offices, partners, and total staff. In addition to the above
characteristics, ownership structure and number of issuer audit clients may also be
suggestive of firm size. For example,it makes sense that sole proprietorships would
likely be smaller in size, and a large number of issuer audit clients would probably
indicate a larger firm. The last demographic characteristic I collected, whether or
not a firm provides a written response, may be an indication of overall firm
responsiveness. A firm that provides a written response may be more likely to
respond and fix quality control system defects in a timely manner.
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In addition to the above characteristics, I examined the occurrence of audit
deficiencies to determine whether these deficiencies had any impact on whether a
firm corrected its quality control system defects. To do so, I classified the audit
deficiencies in each report according to the specific nature ofthe deficiency, based
on Hermanson, Houston,and Rice (2007)in column two of Table 1. Those
classifications include (1) Failure to Perform and Document Various Procedures or
Analyses,(2) Failure to Adequately/Properly Evaluate (related to various issues),
(3) Failure to Test(related to various issues),(4) Failure to Identify or Address
Appropriately GAAP Departures,(5) Inappropriate Reliance on Others' Work (other
external or internal auditors), (6) Documentation Deficiencies, and (7) Other.
Examples of each type of deficiency can be found in Table 3.

Next, I classified the quality control system defects for those firms that did
not correct their deficiencies within the allotted year. These quality control system
defects can be found in the firms' PCAOB inspection reports. I classified each quality
control system defect according to the taxonomy of Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards(GAAS) plus one additional category for system wide deficiencies as
follows:(1) General,(2) Field Work,(3) Reporting, and (4)System Wide. Examples
of each type of quality control deficiency can be found in Table 4.

7.7.

Table 3: Examples of audit deficiency classifications
Audit Deficiency
Failure to Perform and Document
Various Procedures or Analyses

Examples
The failure to perform sufficient audit procedures to
determine whether consulting service costs were
recognized in the proper period.
The failure to perform and document audit
procedures related to an inventory valuation
adjustment

Failure to Adequately/Properly
Evaluate (related to various issues}

The failure to evaluate appropriately the accounting
for an acquisition.

Failure to Test (related to various
issues}

The failure to perform adequate audit procedures to
test the existence and valuation ofinvestments and
goodwill.
The failure to perform and document sufficient tests
of equity transactions in two ofthe audits reviewed.

Failure to Identify, or Address
Appropriately, GAAP Departures

The Firm’s failure to identify, or to address
appropriately, a departure from GAAP that related
to potentially material misstatements in the audited
financial statements concerning the accounting for a
business combination.

Inappropriate Reliance on Others'
Work (other external or internal
auditors}

The unwarranted reliance on revenue data provided
by a third-party service organization.
Inappropriately taking responsibility for the work of
another auditor when the other auditor performed
substantially all of the audit procedures that served
as the basis for the Firm’s opinion.

Documentation Deficiencies

The failure to perform and document an evaluation
of whether substantial doubt exists about an
issuer’s ability to continue as a going concern.

Other

The failure to identify all material subsequent
events and to evaluate the issuer’s disclosure of
these events.

7:^

Table 4: Examples of quality control system defect classiflcations
Quality Control Deficiency

Examples

General

Technical Competence,Due Care,and
Professional Skepticism: The Firm’s
system of quality control appears not to do
enough to ensure technical competence and
the exercise of due care or professional
skepticism.

Field Work

Testing Appropriate to the Audit: The
Firm's system of quality control appears not
to provide sufficient assurance that the Firm
will conduct all testing appropriate to a
particular audit.

Reporting

Auditor Communications: The Firm's
system of quality control appears not to
provide sufficient assurance that the
required auditor communications to the
audit committee,or equivalent, occur and
are properly documented,including the
independence confirmations required by
Independence Standards Board Standard
No. 1,Independence Discussions with Audit
Committees.

System Wide

Concurring Partner Review: Questions
exist about the effectiveness of the Firm’s
existing arrangement for concurring partner
reviews.
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VI. FINDINGS

Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1 predicts that larger firms will be more likely to correct their
quality control system defects within the allotted year. I use the firm characteristics
number of offices, number of partners, and number of professional staff as a proxy
for size. My preliminary findings are shown in Table 5.

My findings in Table 5, Panel A indicate that there may be a relationship
between a firm's number of offices and whether or not they correct their quality
control system defects in a timely manner. While the minimum number of offices of
1 is the same for both types of firms in my sample,the average number of offices
and maximum number of offices are slightly higher for those Type 2 firms that fixed
their quality control system defects. The average number of offices for Type 1 and
Type 2 firms is 1.50 and 2.25, respectively, and the maximum number of offices is 15
and 18 respectively. This slight increase could indicate that firms with more offices,
viewed as larger firms in this study, may be more likely to correct their quality
control system defects within the allotted year.

Table 5, Panel B also presents my findings regarding the relationship
between number of partners and whether a firm corrects its quality control system
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Table 5: Firm characteristics representing size
PANEL A: Number of Offices
1

2

(Did not correct quality
control system defects)

(Corrected quality
control system defects)

1

1

1.50

2.25

15

18

1.72

2.51

1

2

(Did not correct quality
control system defects)

(Corrected quality
control system defects)

Minimum # of Partners

1

1

Average # of Partners

3.60

12.82

39

201

5.79

25.30

Firm Type:
Minimum # of Offices
Average # of Offices
Maximum # of Offices
Standard Deviation

PANEL B: Number of Partners

Firm Type:

Maximum # of Partners
Standard Deviation

PANEL C: Number of Professional Staff

Firm Type:

Minimum # of
Professional Staff
Average # of Professional
Staff
Maximum # of
Professional Staff
Standard Deviation

1

2

(Did not correct quality
control system defects)

(Corrected quality
control system defects)

0

0

19.04

92.65

701

1346

81.35

236.23
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defects. Based on my sample,the minimum number of partners for both firm types
is 1, but the average and maximum number of partners in Type 2 firms is
significantly higher. The average number of partners for Type 1 firms that did not
correct their quality control system defects in a timely manner is 3.60, while the
average number of partners for Type 2 firms is 12.82. Similarly,the maximum
number of partners for Type 1 firms is 39 whereas the maximum number of
partners for Type 2 firms that corrected their deficiencies is 201. With the number
of partners as a proxy for firm size, this could indicate that firms with more
partners, or larger firms,are more likely to correct their quality control system
defects in a timely manner.

Finally, Table 5, Panel C presents my findings regarding the correlation
between the number of professional staff and whether or not they correct their
quality control system defects in the allotted year. Based on my sample, both firm
types have a minimum number of professional staff of0 and,again. Type 2 firms
that corrected their quality control system defects have a higher average and
maximum number of professional staff. Type 1 firms have an average and
maximum number of professional staff of 19.04 and 701, respectively, while Type 2
firms show an average of 92.65 and a maximum of 1346 professional staff. These
findings could indicate that firms with a higher number of professional staff are
more likely to correct their quality control system defects.

Table 6 presents a logistic regression predicting the likelihood that a firm
will be a Type 2, or will fix its quality control system defects. These results indicate
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Table 6: Logistic regression
Parameter

DF

Estimate

Standard
Error

Wald
ChiSquare

Pr >
ChiSq

Intercept

1

-0.6320

0.3801

2.7642

0.0964

Number of Offices

1

-0.3684

0.1776

4.3017

0.0381

Number of Partners

1

0.1966

0.0720

7.4503

0.0063

Number of Professional
Staff

1

-0.00479

0.00356

1.8133

0.1781

Clients per Office

1

-0.0120

0.0291

0.1686

0.6813

Clients per Partner

1

0.0612

0.0780

0.6161

0.4325

Clients per Total Staff

1

-0.2048

0.1150

3.1684

0.0751

Response

1

0.7198

0.3620

3.9531

0.0468
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that number of partners is positively associated with the tendency of a firm to fix its
quality control system defects within the allotted year, but that both number of
offices and number of professional staff are negatively associated with the tendency
to correct quality control system defects. Therefore,the logistic regression results
in Table 6 are inconclusive and neither support nor disprove the prediction that
larger firms are more likely to correct their quality control system defects.

Because the number of offices, number of partners, and number of
professional staff are highly correlated, as shown in Table 7,the results obtained in
a logistic regression model that incudes all of those variables may not be reliable. In
order to eliminate this multicollinearity and to clarify my results, I use factor
analysis [see Table 8)to reduce these variables to the underlying construct that they
collectively represent. This analysis identifies three significant factors, including
one that is primarily a linear combination of my proxies for firm size [see Factor 2 in
Table 8). Therefore, I interpret that factor as representing the underlying construct
of firm size.

Table 9 presents a more parsimonious logistic regression that only includes
the factors identified in Table 8. Factor 2[firm size) has a strong positive
association with a firm's tendency to correct its quality control system defects
within the allotted year[p = 0.0084). These findings support Hypothesis 1,the
prediction that larger firms will be more likely to correct their quality control
system defects in a timely manner.
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Table 7: Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N=188 Prob > r under HO: Rho=0
# Prof.
Staff

#

Clients

Clients

Clients

Clients

per
Partner

per
Office

per
Total
Staff

0.82859

0.66780

0.28826

-0.15048

-0.13057

-0.15522

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

0.0393

0.0741

0.0334

1.00000

0.74485

0.28617

-0.17502

-0.07411

-0.15279

<.0001

<.0001

0.0163

0.3122

0.0363

1.00000

0.18122

-0.14712

-0.08670

-0.13067

0.0128

0.0439

0.2368

0.0739

1.00000

0.55405

0.77597

0.27522

<.0001

<.0001

0.0001

1.00000

0.76108

0.82393

<.0001

<.0001

1.00000

0.50471

#

#

Offices

Partner
s

1.00000

# Offices

0.82859
#

<.0001

Partners

# Prof.
Staff

# Clients

Clients

0.66780

0.74485

<.0001

<.0001

0.28826

0.28617

0.18122

<.0001

<.0001

0.0128

-0.15048

-0.17502

-0.14712

0.55405

0.0393

0.0163

0.0439

<.0001

-0.13057

-0.07411

-0.08670

0.77597

0.76108

0.0741

0.3122

0.2368

<.0001

<.0001

-0.15522

-0.15279

-0.13067

0.27522

0.82393

0.50471

0.0334

0.0363

0.0739

0.0001

<.0001

<.0001

per
Partner

Clients

<.0001

per
Office
Clients
per Total
Staff

1.00000

:^n

Table 8: Rotated factor pattern
Firm
Characteristics

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Number of Offices

-4

92

-1

Number of
Partners

-2

94

8

Number of
Professional Staff

-5

86

2

Number of Clients

78

34

26

Clients per
Partner

93

-15

-14

Clients per Office

91

-7

18

Clients per Total
Staff

76

-16

-39

1

2

93

Response

Table 9: Logistic regression with factor analysis
Parameter
DF
Estimate Standard
Error

Wald ChiSquare

Pr>ChiSq

Intercept

1

-0.7067

0.2893

5.9673

0.0146

Factor 1

1

-0.3363

0.1696

3.9324

0.0474

Factor 2

1

0.8690

0.3297

6.9452

0.0084

Response

1

1.1335

0.3475

10.6394

0.0011
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Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms with more issuer clients scaled by firm size
are less likely to correct quality control system defects identified in PCOAB
inspection reports within the allotted year. To test this prediction, 1 first construct
three proxies for resource strain by dividing the number of clients by the number of
partners, the number of offices, and the total number of partners and professional
staff, to compute clients per partner, clients per office, and clients per total staff.
These variables may be viewed as an indication of a firm's resource strain.

The logistic regression in Table 6 includes all three ofthese proxies for
resource strain. However, none of these are significant at traditional levels.
Therefore, the results presented in Table 6 do not support Hypothesis 2. However,
the factor analysis in Table 8 identifies another factor. Factor 1. This factor is
primarily a combination of the three proxies of resource strain plus the raw number
of issuer clients. Therefore, Factor 1 may be viewed as representing the underlying
construct of resource strain. 1 also include this factor in the more parsimonious
logistic regression model in Table 9. In this model, Factor 1 is negatively associated
with a firm's tendency to correct its quality control system defects within the
allotted year[p = 0.0474). These results support the prediction that firms with
more issuer clients scaled by firm size, or more resource strain, are less likely to
correct quality control system defects within the allotted year.
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Hypothesis 3:

Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms with only one partner are less likely to
correct their quality control system defects within the allotted year. Due to a
potential lack of accountability and shortage of resources,it is probable that firms
with one partner will not correct their quality control system defects as often as
firms with a greater number of partners.

My findings in Table 10 show that there is a higher percentage of Type 1
firms with only one partner, with nearly twice as many one partner Type 1 firms
than Type 2 firms. In my sample,33 Type 1 firms had only one partner as compared
to only 16 Type 2 firms that did not correct their quality control system defects.
Similarly, the analysis in Table 6 indicated a positive association between number of
partners and the tendency to correct quality control system defects in a timely
manner. These findings suggest that it is less likely that firms with one partner will
correct their quality control system defects.

Table 10: Firms with one partner versus firms with multiple partners
1
2
Firm Type:

Number of firms with

(Did not fix quality
control system defects)

(Fixed quality control
system defects)

33

16

61

78

35.11%

17.02%

one partner:
Number offirms with
more than one partner:
Percentage with only
one partner

33

Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 predicts that firms who provide a written response to PCAOB
inspection reports are more likely to correct their quality control system defects
within the allotted year. Inspected firms are given the option to provide a written
response to PCAOB inspection reports to be published along with the inspection
report. I use the existence of a written response,regardless ofthe nature ofthe
response, to gauge a firm's overall responsiveness. My preliminary findings are
shown in Table 11.

Table 11; Firms' written responses to PCAOB inspection reports
2
1
Firm T}T3e:

(Did not fix quality
control system defects)

(Fixed quality control
system defects)

Number that provided a
written response:

54

75

Number that did not
provide a written
response:

40

19

57.45%

79.57%

Percentage that
provided a written
response:

Based on my sample,the results in Table 11 show that a significantly higher
number of Type 2 firms provided written responses. Nearly eighty percent of the
Type 2 firms that corrected their quality control system defects in a timely manner
also provided a written response. When compared to only 57.45% of Type 1 firms
that provided a written response,this may indicate an association between a firm's
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level of responsiveness and whether or not they fix their quality control system
defects.

The results of the initial logistic regression in Table 6 show similar findings:
that there is a strong positive association between a firm providing a written
response and the tendency to correct quality control system defects. This variable
is also positive and significant in the more parsimonious logistic regression model in
Table 9(p = 0.0011). These findings support the prediction that firms who provide
a written response to PCAOB inspection reports are more likely to correct their
quality control system defects within the allotted year.

Other Findings:

In addition to the tests relating to my four hypotheses,there are also several
interesting findings pertaining to firms who do not correct their quality control
system defects. Because information regarding audit engagement deficiencies are
made public in all inspection reports, I am able to explore differences in those
deficiencies between Type 1 and Type 2 firms. Table 12 shows the number of each
type of audit deficiency disclosed in the inspection reports of both Type 1 and Type
2 firms. Recall that the quality control system defects are not initially made
available and are only eventually made public for those firms that do not correct
those defects. Therefore,it is difficult to identify any relationships between specific
audit deficiencies and either the existence of quality control system defects or
whether or not the firm corrects these deficiencies. However, my findings show that
there are more total audit

Table 12: Classification of identified audit deficiencies

Did not fix quality
control system defects

Fixed quality control
system defects

Failure to Perform and
Document Various
Procedures or Analyses

49

50

Failure to
Adequately/Properly
Evaluate (related to
various issues}

37

21

Failure to Test (related to
various issues}

39

24

Failure to Identify, or
Address Appropriately,
GAAP Departures

19

12

9

11

Documentation
Deficiencies

6

3

Other

2

0

161

121

Audit Deficiency

Inappropriate Reliance on
Others' Work (other
external or internal
auditors}

TOTAL:
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deficiencies identified in Type 1 firms that do not fix their quality control system
defects. While Type 2 firms only have 121 total identified audit deficiencies, Type 1
firms have 161 identified audit deficiencies.

As well as recording the audit deficiencies for both Type 1 and 2 firms, I also
classify the quality control system defects according to the Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards plus one additional category as shown in Table 13. As the
quality control system defects for Type 2 firms are not disclosed, it is difficult to
draw any conclusions about the relationship between the type of deficiency and
whether or not a firm corrects these deficiencies.

Table 13: Classification of disclosed quality control system defects
Number found in Type 1
Quality Control System Defect

(Did not fix quality control system defects)

General

58

Field Work

45

Reporting

36

System Wide

59

TOTAL:

198

I also examine the differences in ownership structures between Type 1 and
Type 2 firms. As ownership structure is not necessarily indicative of size, I chose
not to test this variable as a proxy for firm size. My findings with regard to
ownership structure are summarized in Table 14. My findings show no significant
differences in ownership structure between the two firm types.

37

Table 14: Ownership structures among Type 1 and Type 2 firms
Did not fix
quality control
system defects

%

Fixed quality
control system
defects

Corporation

45

48.39%

39

41.94%

Partnership

6

6.45%

6

6.45%

LLP or LLC

29

31.18%

40

43.01%

Sole Proprietorship

12

12.90%

8

8.60%

Other

1

1.08%

0

0.00%

Ownership
Structure

%
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VII. CONCLUSION

The PCAOB conducts inspections of audit firms with 100 or fewer issuer audit
clients every three years, and firms are given one year to correct any quality control
system defects identified in the inspection before they are made public. I examined
188 PCAOB inspection reports of triennially inspected audit firms, half of which
corrected their quality control system defects within the allotted year,and half that
did not. 1 hand collected data from publicly available PCAOB inspection reports in
order to determine whether any firm characteristics were associated with the firm s
tendency to fix their quality control system defects in a timely manner. 1 predict
that:

1. Larger firms are more likely to correct their quality control system defects within
the allotted year.
2. Firms with more issuer clients scaled by firm size are less likely to correct their
quality control system defects within the allotted year.
3. Firms with only one partner are less likely to correct their quality control defects
within the allotted year than are firms with more than one partner.
4. Firms who provide written responses to PCAOB inspection reports are more
likely to correct their quality control system defects.
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The results of this thesis support these predictions. Specifically, my findings
indicate that firm size is positively associated with a firm’s tendency to correct its
quality control system defects. On the other hand, my results suggest ±at resource
strain limits the likelihood that firms will correct their quality control system
defects. 1 further find evidence that firms who provide a written response to PCAOB
inspection reports are more likely to correct their quality control system defects.

These findings are important because there is less prior research on the
inspection reports of triennially inspected firms with 100 or less issuer audit clients,
specifically on the quality control system defects in those reports. In the Peer
Review Program, quality control system defects were disclosed immediately and
served as an indication of audit quality. This study is also important because under
the PCAOB,quality control system defects are not immediately disclosed, and prior
research has shown associations between certain firm characteristics and audit
quality.

Opportunities for future research include examining the relationships
between identified audit deficiencies and disclosed quality control system defects in
the PCAOB inspection reports of those firms that do not correct their quality control
system defects within the allotted year. As there were only 94 firms whose quality
control system defects had been made public at the time of my research, it would
have been difficult to look into relationships between specific audit deficiencies and
quality control system defects. As the amount of inspection reports with disclosed
quality control system defects grows,it will be more feasible to research these

40

relationships. Similar to the findings ofthe current study,this future research could
help users of inspection reports make assumptions about audit quality in those
reports that do not disclose a firm's quality control system defects.
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Notes Concerning this Report
1. Portions of this report may describe deficiencies or potential deficiencies in the systems,
policies, procedures, practices, or conduct of the firm that is the subject of this report.
The express inclusion of certain deficiencies and potential deficiencies, however, should
not be construed to support any negative inference that any other aspect of the firm’s
systems, policies, procedures, practices, or conduct is approved or condoned by the
Board or judged by the Board to comply with laws, rules, and professional standards.
2. Any references in this report to violations or potential violations of law, rules, or
professional standards should be understood in the supervisory context in which this
report was prepared. Any such references are not a result of an adversarial adjudicative
process and do not constitute conclusive findings of fact or of violations for purposes of
imposing legal liability. Similarly, any description herein of a firm’s cooperation in
addressing issues constructively should not be construed, and is not construed by the
Board, as an admission, for purposes of potential legal liability, of any violation.
3. Board inspections encompass, among other things, whether the firm has failed to
identify departures from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles("GAAP")in its audits
of financial statements. This report’s descriptions of any such auditing failures
necessarily involve descriptions of the related GAAP departures. The Board, however,
has no authority to prescribe the form or content of an issuer's financial statements.
That authority, and the authority to make binding determinations concerning an issuer’s
compliance with GAAP, rests with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission"). Any description, in this report, of perceived departures from GAAP
should not be understood as an indication that the Commission has considered or made
any determination regarding these GAAP issues unless otherwise expressly stated.
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INSPECTION OF PERRELLA & ASSOCIATES,P.A.
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB" or "the Board") has
conducted an inspection of the registered public accounting firm Perrella & Associates,
P.A. ("the Firm"). The Board is issuing this report of that inspection in accordance with
the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002("the Act").
The Board is making portions of the report publicly available. Specifically, the
Board is releasing to the public Part I of the report and portions of Part IV of the reoort.
Part IV of the report consists of the Finn's comments, if any, on a draft of the report.The Board has elsewhere described in detail its approach to making inspectionrelated information publicly available consistent with legal restrictions.^ A substantial
portion of the Board's criticisms of a firm (specifically criticisms of the firm’s quality
control system), and the Board's dialogue with the firm about those criticisms, occurs
out of public view, unless the firm fails to make progress to the Board's satisfection in
addressing those criticisms. In addition, the Board generally does not disclose
otherwise nonpublic information, learned through inspections, about the firm or its
clients. Accordingly, information in those categories generally does not appear in the
publicly available portion of an inspection report.

If

The Board does not make public any of a firm's comments that address a
nonpublic portion of the report. In addition, pursuant to section 104(f) of the Act, 15
U.S.C. § 7214(f), and PCAOB Rule 4007(b), if a firm requests, and the Board grants,
confidential treatment for any of the firm's comments on a draft report, the Board does
not include those comments in the final report at all. The Board notes that it routinely
grants confidential treatment, if requested, for any of a firm's comments that identify
factually inaccurate statements in the draft that the Board corrects in the final report.
2J

See Statement Concerning the Issuance of Inspection Reports, PCAOB
Release No. 104-2004-001 (August 26, 2004).
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PARTI
INSPECTION PROCEDURES AND CERTAIN OBSERVATIONS
Members of the Board's inspection staff ("the inspection team") conducted
fieldwork for the inspection from June 7, 2004 to June 10,2004. The fieldwork included
procedures tailored to the nature of the Firm, certain aspects of which the inspection
team understood at the outset of the inspection to be as follows;
Number of offices

1 (Pompano Beach, Florida)

Ownership structure

Corporation

Number of partners

1

Number of professional staff-

3

Number of issuer audit clients^' 8
Board inspections are designed to identify and address weaknesses and
deficiencies related to how a firm conducts audits. To achieve that goal. Board
inspections include reviews of certain aspects of selected audits performed by the firm
and reviews of other matters related to the firm's quality control system.
In the course of reviewing aspects of selected audits, an inspection may identify
ways in which a particular audit is deficient, including failures by the firm to identify, or to
address appropriately, respects in which an issuer's financial statements do not present
3/

'Professional staff" includes all personnel of the Firm, except partners or
shareholders and administrative support personnel. The number of partners and
professional staff is provided here as an indication of the size of the Firm, and does not
necessarily represent the number of the Firm's professionals who participate in audits of
issuers or are "associated persons"(as defined in the Act)of the Firm.
4.

The number of issuer audit clients shown here is based on the Firm's selfreporting and the inspection team's review of certain information for inspection planning
purposes. It does not reflect any Board determination concerning which, or how many,
of the Firm’s audit clients are "issuers" as defined in the Act.
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fairly the financial position, results of operations, or cash flows of the issuer in
conformity with GAAP.^ It is not the purpose of an inspection, however, to review all of
a firm's audits or to identify every respect in which a reviewed audit is deficient.
Accordingly, a Board inspection report should not be understood to provide any
assurance that the firm's audits, or its issuer clients' financial statements, are free of any
deficiencies not specifically described in an inspection report.
A.

Review of Audit Engagements

The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of aspects of
the performance of five of the Firm's audits of the financial statements of issuers. Those
audits and aspects were selected according to the Board's criteria, and the Firm was not
allowed an opportunity to limit or influence the selection process.
The inspection team identified matters that it considered to be audit
deficiencies.^ The deficiencies identified in all five of the audits reviewed included
deficiencies of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm
did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer's
financial statements. Those deficiencies included (1)

the Firm's failure to identify, or to address appropriately, a departure from
GAAP that related to potentially material misstatements in the audited
financial statements concerning the loss per share;

§

When it comes to the Board's attention that an issuer^s financial
statements appear not to present fairly, in a material respect, the financial position,
results of operations or cash flows of the issuer in conformity with GAAP, the Board
reports that information to the SEC. which has jurisdiction to determine proper
accounting in issuers'financial statements.
6/

PCAOB standards require a firm to take appropriate actions to assess the
importance of audit deficiencies identified after the date of the audit report to the firm's
present ability to support its previously expressed opinions. See AU 390, Consideration
of Omitted Procedures After the Report Date, and AU 561, Subsequent Discovery of
Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditor's Report (both included among the PCAOB’s
interim auditing standards, pursuant to PCAOB Rule 3200T). Failure to comply with
these PCAOB standards could be a basis for Board disciplinary sanctions.
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(2)

the failure to perform appropriate audit procedures related to a business
combination;

(3)

on two audits, inappropriately taking responsibility for the work of another
auditor when the other auditor performed substantially all of the audit
procedures that served as the basis for the Firm's opinion;

(4)

on two audits, the failure to audit appropriately nonmonetary transactions
involving issuances of stock;

(5)

the failure to perform and document appropriate tests of inventory;

(6)

the failure to perform and document appropriate audit tests regarding the
extinguishment of debt;

(7)

the failure to perform and document a consideration of the implications of
the payment of issuer costs by related entities; and

(8)

on one audit, the failure to perform and document any procedures (a) to
test three significant balance sheet accounts;(b) related to a write-off of a
related party receivable balance, the issuance of shares of common stock
in exchange for services, and the computation of weighted average shares
outstanding used in computing loss per share; and (c) to search for
unrecorded liabilities or to obtain an understanding of the issuer’s
business, accounting processes, and related internal controls.

Following the inspection fieldwork and the inspection team's discussion with the
Firm of the matters identified above, the Firm performed additional audit procedures and
identified misstatements in two issuers’ financial statements. The issuers subsequently
restated their financial statements.B.

Review of Quality Control System

In addition to evaluating the quality of the audit work performed ori specific
audits, the inspection included review of certain of the Firm's practices, policies and
procedures related to audit quality. This review encompassed practices, policies and
1!

The Board inspection process did not include any review of the additional
audit work or the restated financial statements.
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procedures concerning audit performance, training, compliance with independence
standards, client acceptance and retention, and the establishment of policies and
procedures. As described above, any defects in, or criticisms of, the Firm's quality
control system are discussed in the nonpublic portion of this report and will remain
nonpublic unless the Firm fails to address them to the Board's satisfaction within 12
months of the date of this report.
END OF PART I
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PORTIONS OF THE REST OF THIS REPORT ARE NONPUBLIC AND ARE OMIHED
FROM THIS PUBLIC DOCUMENT
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PART II

B.

Issues Related to Quality Controls

The inspection of the Firm included consideration of aspects of the Firm's system
of quality control. Assessment of a firm's quality control system rests both on review of
a firm’s stated quality control policies and procedures and on inferenres that can be
drawn from respects in which a firm’s system has failed to assure quality in the actual
performance of engagements.*' On the basis of the irtformation report^ by the
inspection team, the Board has the following concerns about aspects of the i
system of quality control.
Audit Performance
A firm's system of quality control should provide reasonable assurance that the
work performed on an audit engagement will meet applicable professional standards
and regulatory requirements. On the basis of the information reported by the mspectran
team, including the audit performance deficiencies described in Part II.A and any o
deficiencies identified below, the Board has concerns that the Firms system of quality
control fails to provide such reasonable assurance in at least the following respec
a.

Technical Competence, Due Care, and Professional Skepticism

not to do enough to ensure
The Firm's system of quality control appears
■ ^
■
technical competence and the exercise of due care or professional skepticism.
b.

Appropriate Procedures

The Firm’s system of quality control appears not to provide reas
assurance that the Firm will conduct all testing appropriate to a particular audi.
information reported by the inspection team suggests an apparent pattern ot lai u
a/

A firm's failure to comply with the requirements of PCAOB standards when
performing an audit may be an indication of a potentially significant defect in a i
quality control system even if that failure did not result in an insufficiently supported
audit opinion.
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perform the appropriate procedures related to the testing of equity transactions [Issuers
B and C]. as well as an apparent pattern of inappropriate reliance on the work of other
auditors to perform substantially all of the audit procedures that serve as the basis for
the Firm’s opinion. [Issuers A and E]
c.

Concurring Partner Review

Questions exist about the effectiveness of the Firm’s existing arrangement for
concurring partner reviews. Having procedures for concumng partner review by a
competent reviewer is an important element of quality control. Such reviews should
involve the performance of appropriate procedures using due care and professional
skepticism, with the Firm appropriately addressing the reviewer's findings and
documenting the process. The Firm used the services of an accountant not affiliated
with the Firm to perform the concurring partner review of the five issuer audits included
in the inspection. The information reported by the inspection team suggests that there
is no evidence that the concurring partner review procedure used by the Firm resulted in
the identification of any of the deficiencies noted by the inspection team. On one
engagement, the concurring review did not take place until after the financial statements
had been filed with the SEC. [Issuer D] With respect to the other four engagements,
the failure may result from a lack of competency, due care or professional skepticism on
the part of the concurring partner; deficiencies in the scope of the concurring partner's
procedures; and/or the Firm's failure to properly address the concumng partner findings.
Apparent deficiencies in documentation of the scope and results of the concumng
partner’s reviews preclude the Board from determining the relative contribution of each
of these potential causes to the failure of the concurring partner process to prevent the
deficiencies reported by the inspection team.
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PART IV
RESPONSE OF THE FIRM TO DRAFT INSPECTION REPORT
Pursuant to section 104(f) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 7214(f), and PCAOB Rule
4007(a). the Board provided the Firm an opportunity to review and comment on a draft
of this report. The Firm provided a written response.
Pursuant to section 104(0 of the Act and PCAOB Rule 4007(b), if a firm requests,
and the Board grants, confidential treatment for any of the firm's comments on a draft
report, the Board does not include those comments in the final report. The Board
routinely grants confidential treatment, if requested, for any of a firm's comments that
identify factually inaccurate statements in the draft that the Board corrects in the final
report.
Pursuant to section 104(f) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 4007(b), the Firm's
response, minus any portion granted confidential treatment, is attached hereto and
made part of this final inspection report. In any version of this report that the Board
makes publicly available, any portions of the Firm's response that address nonpublic
portions of the report are omitted.
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perrella & Associates. P.A
CERTinED PUBUC ACCOUNTAMTS
555a POWERUNE ROAD

Pompano Beach Florida 330693018
tele:(954)9795353
Fax:(954)9796695

September 27,2006
Mr. George H.Diacont,
Director
Division of Registration and Inspections
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
1666 K Street. N.W.
Washingtoa DC 20006
Re: Response to Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Report of
2004 Inspection of Perrella & Associates,PA
Dear Mr. Diacont
We appreciate the oppommity to review and comment on the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board's(TCAOB" or "Board") draft Report on 2004 Inspection
of Perrella & Associates, P.A.("Report").
Perrella & Associates, PA.("Firm") is committed to improvement in its audit quality
and the PCAOB's inspection comments and report contribute directly to diat process.
The PCAOB has proven its commitment to help restore investor confidence in die
capital markets and in the public accounting prrfession to improve audit quali^ by
having a highly dedicated professional staff. Our Insperfons' staff provided
constructive dialog and performed an in depth review of issuer's files resulting in
quality and detailed comments. We take seriously the findings identified by die Board
during the 2004 inspection of our 2003 audit engagements, and we will incorporate
these findings into our ongoing audit quality efforts.
We have taken, and are continuing to take, substantive steps to address the Board's
findings and concerns that we believe are necessary to improve our audit quab^ and
that are responsive to those findings and concerns. Significant steps taken indude more
skeptical client acceptance, more extensive audit documoitation to support auditor's
representations, enhanced concurring reviewer procedures, staff education and better
adherence to standards when audit procedures are performed by other auditors. These
steps also include changes made to our audit procedures in response to PCAOB
Auditing Standard No. 3 related to audit documentation, which became effective in
2004.
The comments that follow respond to Part I - hispection Procedures and Cerim
Observations of the Firms 2004 Inspection Report The inspection of each of the
engagements selected was performed thoroughly. Professional judgment is involved in
both performance of an audit and the subsequentinspection process,and we view the
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Board's comments as positive and helpfuL We accept the PCAOB's findings in flie
Report
With respect to the findings identified by the Board in the Report we
considered whether it was necessary to perform additional procedures in accordance
with AU 390, Considenjh'on of Omitted Procedures After the Report Date, and AU 561,
Subsequent Discovery of Facts Existing at the DaU ofthe Auditor's Report. For a number of
findings, additional procedures were necessary, were performed and or enhanced
documentation ivas obtained or prepared. We and two clients agreed that fheir
financial statements needed to be restated based on findings. As a result of these
actions, we have concluded that no new facts came to our attention that caused us to
believe that our previously issued reports should be withdrawn. Part II discusses
findings and spedfic procedures.
We take seriously the Board's findings, and recognize the need to have in place flte
ability to execute and document audit procedures in accordance with PCAOB
standards. Appropriate testing was done in some findings,but the work papers did not
partially or at^capture the testing or rational imderlining all conclusions. Under new
audit documentation standards,the outcome is not the judge of audit documentation.
We have taken substantive steps, as mentioned above,to enhance our audit procedures
in order to begin to meet the standards of the Board. Additionally, we have
we
significantly reduced our public company client base. At the time of our inspection,
had eight nucro-cap issuers. Followring our inspection, we decided to reduce the
number of issuers. Today we have two. The purpose is to better serve those clients and
more importantly, to ensure that quality controls and abilities are in place for our size
and resources.

We have a better imderstanding of the importance and need to strengtiien our Firm as
we work with the PCAOB in order to improve audit quality. We would be pleased to
discuss our response or answer any questions the Staff or Board may have regardmg
this response.
Sincerely,

Yin

f

Redacted
Comments on Non-public Aspects ofReport
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A.

Issues related to Quality Controls
Perrella and Associates, PA acknowledges the professional performance of
the PCAOB and its staff and what has been accomplished in a short time.
We desire to continue our public company audit practice and recognize that
we must enhance our professional standards, whidi consist of auditing,
attestation, quality control, ethics, and independence standards and related
rules of audit reports for Issuers, as defined by the Sarbanes-Qxley Act
Significant steps taken to meet those standards Include mote skeptical client
acceptance, more extensive audit documentation to support our auditor's
representations, enhanced concum'ng reviewer procedures, staff educafion
and better adherence to standards when audit procedures are performed by
other auditors.
Regarding client acceptance, we had listed eight audit dienls during the time
of our review. As of today, only one of them is retained. Of the seven, one
was not an issuer, one is non-reporting and five were declined. The five
declined Issuers were acquired and there were no retaining benefits by the
acquirer at acquisition or soon thereafter. Our skepfidsm of dient
acceptance wiil include an issuer’s ability to recognize their responsiWlities
and our ability to meet PCAOB professional standards in regard to the issuer.
Audit documentation wriil be in compliance with PCAOB Audffing Standard
No. 3, Release No. 2004-006, which became effective in 2004. A complete
understanding of the nature, purpose and recording of share transactions vwD
be emphasized. Our concurring reviewer has agreed to and will have more
involvement in the audit process.
We take this review and report seriously and have responded to all
deficiencies in the engagements as best as we could. We have take steps to
implement the enhancements of the Firm's quality controls.

PERRELLA & ASSOOATES,P.A.
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